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INTRODUCTION

The last decade has seen a considerable shift in the way electric
utilities provide service to their customers. This change is most apparent
in the tremendous growth of small-scale, behind-the-meter generation that
largely occurs at the residential and small commercial level and is heavily
reliant upon solar photovoltaic (PV) technologies. Historically, only large
Copyright 2020, by DAVID E. DISMUKES.
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Center for Energy Studies and Professor, Department of Environmental Sciences,
Louisiana State University. The author wishes to thank Stephen Butler, Elizabeth
Oleks, and Michael Deupree for their research assistance. The author also wishes
to acknowledge that a large part of the work presented here arises from his work
with the Louisiana Public Service Commission Staff and their outside counsel on
several different net metering proceedings.

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 65

5/21/20 8:22 AM

420

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VIII

industrial customers had the ability to self-generate their own electricity
because the costs associated with smaller-scale electric generation
technologies were simply too prohibitive relative to utility-provided
service. Today, technological innovation, federal and state public policies
and tax incentives, and substantive equipment and decreasing installation
costs have created meaningful solar self-generation opportunities for
smaller-scale customers. In several states, regulatory policies known as
“net energy metering” (NEM) regulations have helped to facilitate not
only small-scale generation interconnection to the distribution system, but
also the “sale” of unused self-generation to the utility distribution grid.
NEM policies also typically include special regulatory provisions that
require utilities to establish a relatively streamlined and consistent process
for distribution-level interconnection, as well as a regulatory-established
(and posted) set of rates or credits that are offered as reimbursement for
NEM-generated electricity put (or “sold”) to a regulated electric utility’s
distribution grid.
NEM regulations allow small-scale generators to “put” their excess,
self-generated electricity to the distribution grid when it is not utilized onsite. These NEM customers are also “charged” for any additional electric
utility service they take, usually at night when solar technologies are not
operational. Hence, the prefix “net” in NEM regulations: customers taking
advantage of these policies have their energy charges and credits
reconciled or “netted” at the end of the month. If an NEM customer “sells
back” more electricity than he or she uses, that NEM customer will receive
a credit. If that NEM customer uses more electricity than it sells back, it
will have a net charge for the month (albeit one lower than if it took 100%
of its service from a utility).
The original purpose of many NEM policies was to remove market
barriers for small scale, behind-the-meter generation.1 Three common
market barriers to the development of these behind-the-meter resources
have existed in the past, including: (1) the inability to interconnect and
synchronize these resources with the local utility distribution grid; (2) the
ability to continue to receive certain retail electricity services at times
when the behind-the-meter generation may not be operational; and (3) the
ability to sell excess electricity generated by these behind-the-meter
resources at times when that on-site generation is not needed. These
1. “Behind-the-meter” generation comes from a renewable energy
generating facility (most commonly solar) that generates electricity for on-site
use, at a home, business or industrial facility. The physical location is “behindthe-meter” on the owner’s property, not on the side of the electric distribution grid
or utility.
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barriers are not dissimilar to those that are faced by large scale industrial
cogeneration applications that were removed by the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). In fact, as will be discussed
later, many NEM policies arose during the same time period in which
PURPA was also being implemented and refined as a distribution-level
analogue to promote additional customer-owned generation.2 Historically,
behind-the-meter, NEM systems that were interconnected to a utility’s
distribution grid were few in number and considered a type of niche
application. The emergence of substantial financial incentives, tax breaks,
and cost reductions in small scale generation technologies, particularly
solar PV, has substantially increased NEM participation over the past
decade, far exceeding many utilities’ and their regulators’ expectations.
The rapid growth of NEM systems has not come without a
considerable degree of regulatory and policy concern. In the past, NEM
policies developed in a manner that paid little attention to program design
inefficiencies and the implications these inefficiencies would have on
other utility ratepayers if NEM participation grew to relatively large levels.
Regulators and utility companies did not worry about the rapid growth of
NEM participation in the 1990s and early 2000s since technology and
costs tended to naturally limit participation levels. However, the recent
growth of behind-the-meter solar generation has forced many state utility
regulators to go back and revisit, and potentially reform, their existing
rules and policies on what constitutes NEM, how NEM generation will be
measured, and, more importantly, how NEM systems will be reimbursed
for the electricity they put (or “sell”) on to the electric distribution grid.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the evolution of solar NEM
installations, solar cost trends driving new installations, and how these
rapid technological and economic changes in the development of behindthe-meter generation have forced many state utility regulators to modify
their respective NEM rules and regulation. It will also examine the
implications these changes have for both NEM customers and the broader
class of ratepayers that do not have NEM installations. The Article will
further reference specific state regulations and examine how these NEM
policy issues have been handled in Louisiana’s recent reform activities.

2. In 1978, Congress passed the “National Energy Act” (NEA), which was
composed of five different statutes, one of which was PURPA. The goal of
PURPA was to eliminate barriers to industrial “CHP” applications in order to
increase energy efficiency and improve electric system reliability.
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I. NEM INSTALLATION, CAPACITY, AND COST TRENDS
The following subsections will analyze the considerable growth in
installed NEM capacity in Louisiana and the United States as well as the
cost trends and state and federal policy incentives that have contributed to
NEM development.
A. NEM Installation and Capacity Trends
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects NEM
data as part of its “Monthly Electric Sales and Revenue with State
Distributions Report” that is filed by electric utilities and suppliers, also
known as the Form EIA 861M.3 The purpose of this form is to collect
information from electric utility companies, energy service providers, and
distribution companies that sell or deliver electric power to end users. The
survey was expanded in 2011 to include data on NEM installations, NEM
installation types, NEM capacities, and NEM net generation.4 This
expansion was, without a doubt, driven by the rapid development of these
types of installations and the fact that existing data series on these
installations was lacking, thereby making it difficult to comprehensively
and accurately examine trends and make comparisons across differing
states. While the expanded version of this data currently allows for
national and state level comparisons, these comparisons are unfortunately
limited to time periods starting in 2011.
Figure 1 shows the trend in the United States and Louisiana NEM
capacity installations over the past several years. In 2019 there were 2.1
million U.S. NEM customers with over 22,358 megawatts (MW) of NEM
capacity. Louisiana reported 24,424 NEM installations, accounting for
over 146 MW of capacity. These NEM installations, at the federal and
state level, are almost entirely dominated by solar energy (94% at the
national level, 100% in Louisiana).5 It is important to note that EIA’s NEM
data for Louisiana is across the entire state and accounts for those behindthe-meter installations interconnected into utilities regulated by the
3. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) collects, analyzes,
and disseminates independent and impartial energy information to promote sound
policymaking, efficient markets, and public understanding of energy and its
interaction with the economy and the environment.
4. Net generation is defined as gross NEM system generation less on-site
electricity consumption.
5. EIA-861M (formerly EIA-826) Detailed Data, Net Metering 2011
through 2019, U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/
data/eia861m/ [https://perma.cc/W6K6-YVTU] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
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Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC, or the Commission), as
well as those regulated by municipal utilities, and the City Council of New
Orleans (which regulates Entergy New Orleans, LLC).
Over the past eight years, U.S. NEM capacity has grown at an average
annual compound rate of 41%, while Louisiana NEM capacity has grown
at an average annual compound rate of about 55% over the same time
period. Louisiana currently ranks twentieth among the states in total NEM
installed capacity.6 Louisiana also ranks third among the 11 states in the
Southeast region in terms of solar/NEM capacity as a share of total in-state
generation.7 Thus, Louisiana is a state with a larger than average number
of NEM installations, capacity, and generation, and it is not surprising that
Louisiana has been faced with a number of the same policy and legal
challenges that other leading states have been facing with these behindthe-meter solar NEM installations.

Figure 1: U.S. and Louisiana Installed Capacity (MW)8

6. Id.
7. Id. Form EIA-860 Detailed Data with Previous Form Data (EIA860A/860B), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/
data/eia860/ [https://perma.cc/M2SR-CCMJ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
8. Form EIA-861M (formerly EIA-826) Detailed Data, U.S. ENERGY INFO
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861m/ [https://perma.cc/M2SRCCMJ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). Disclaimer: Figure includes both LPSC-
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Figure 2 compares state-level NEM capacity growth over the past
eight years. Louisiana’s NEM capacity growth, on a percentage basis, is
in the upper tier of those states seeing rapid NEM (solar) growth.
Louisiana’s NEM growth rates are comparable to, if not better than, states
“progressive” states on renewable energy policy, such as California,
Oregon, and Pennsylvania.

Figure 2: Average Annual Net Metered Capacity Growth (August 2011 through July 2019)9

Three factors contribute to the dramatic growth in solar NEM
installations across the country: (1) the reduction of solar panel and
installation costs; (2) regulatory policies encouraging renewable energy
development; and (3) federal and state tax policies encouraging solar
development.
B. NEM Cost Trends
Considerable PV installation cost decreases has largely driven the
recent growth in NEM installation, much of which can be attributed to the
jurisdictional and non-LPSC-jurisdictional utilities. Also, the drop-off in January
2016 is attributable to data irregularities.
9. Id.
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acceleration of the global PV module market. Figure 3 shows PV exports
across the globe have experienced a 41% compound annual growth rate
from 2004 through 2017, reaching 90 gigawatts (GW) of PV capacity
shipped in 2017.10 In addition to seeing dramatic growth, the leadership
position in the global PV market has shifted over the past decade from
country to country. In 2000, the United States accounted for 30% of global
PV supply,11 but in 2018, it accounted for a market share of only 0.41%,
its lowest level to date.12 Growth in the market first shifted to Japan, which
experienced significant growth due to residential subsidies enacted in the
mid-1990s; the market then shifted to Germany, whose generous feed-in
tariff subsidy produced substantial growth in German domestic solar
demand; and finally to China and developing Asian countries, which
invested heavily in PV manufacturing beginning in 2006.13 In 2018, Asian
countries accounted for 98% of all PV shipments, with China supplying
57% of all total PV shipments.14

10. DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., PV MARKET
UPDATE 12 (2018), https://arpa-e.energy.gov/sites/default/files/Q4%202017%20
Solar%20DRAFT_MLdf2_ed_MOSAIC_meeting_posting_Kelsey.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7GK3-96EK].
11. GALEN BARBOSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUNSHOT VISION
STUDY 3–4 (2012).
12. DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., Q4 2018/Q1
2019 SOLAR INDUSTRY UPDATE 46 (2019), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19
osti/73992.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FGW-RM6U].
13. Id. Feed-in tariffs can be used as a policy mechanism to encourage
investment in new or developing technologies by providing compensation in the
form of a tariff that is set above the prevailing wholesale or retail rate.
14. Id.
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Figure 3: Photovoltaic Module Exports15

Figure 4 shows the use of foreign manufactured PV modules is a factor
for the decrease in PV prices. Installations using internationally
manufactured PV modules have been consistently less expensive than U.S.
product installations.16 In 2018, the price of modules sold in the United
States decreased by 25%; however, such prices were still 61% higher than
the global average.17 Additionally, the massive growth in PV
manufacturing around the world has also increased supply and put
downward pressure on PV module prices globally.18
15. Id.
16. Id. at 61.
17. Id.
18. See William Pentland, Trade Duties on Solar Imports from China and
Taiwan Clear Final Hurdle, FORBES, (Jan. 22, 2015, 10:32 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2015/01/22/trade-duties-on-solar-imports-fromchina-and-taiwan-clear-final-hurdle/#3d581fdc54e7 [https://perma.cc/2YT8-GA
KM] (It should be noted that in January 2015, the U.S. International Trade
Commission determined that the U.S. PV industry is being materially injured by
imports of “certain crystalline silicon photovoltaic products from China and Taiwan
that the U.S. Department of Commerce has determined are sold in the United States
at less than fair value and are subsidized by the government of China.” This
decision will result in the U.S. Department of Commerce imposing countervailing
duties and antidumping duties on solar imports from China).
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Figure 4: Price Differences between U.S. and non-U.S. Solar PV Modules19

Figure 5 shows the cost of a solar PV module in 2000 was around $4
per watt of DC capacity. This cost remained relatively constant until 2008,
after which prices plunged to the current levels of under $1 per watt. This
decrease affected many domestic solar producers, and U.S. PV
manufacturing declined significantly as a result. In 2017, U.S. PV
production fell by 66% (cells) and 43% (modules), on a year over year
basis.20 While domestic solar producers have suffered, the increase in
imports of less expensive solar modules has resulted in a boon for solar
customers.21

19. DAVID FELDMAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., SOLAR
INDUSTRY UPDATE 61 (2019), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/73992.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8ZE-DGMX].
20. FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 19.
21. GALEN BARBOSE ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., INSTALLED
PRICE TRENDS FOR DISTRIBUTED PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES - 2018 EDITION 21 (2018).
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Figure 5: Total Installed PV Price is Decreasing Due to Low Module Costs22

The total cost of a PV system is made up of the module costs, the
inverter costs and “balance of system” or “BOS” costs.23 BOS costs now
account for a large share of the total PV system cost. Figure 6 depicts the
cost components for residential, commercial, and utility scale systems
from 2010 to 2018. Since 2010, the price of residential PV system costs
has declined 63%, and the majority of this decrease is attributable to
module prices falling 82% over that period.24

22. Id. at 21, fig. 13.
23. Balance of system costs include items such as permitting fees, installation
labor, overhead, racking, customer acquisition costs, and sales tax.
24. RAN FU ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. SOLAR
PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM COST BENCHMARK: Q1 2018, at 21 (2018).
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Figure 6: Module, Inverter and Balance of System Costs, 2010–201825

State policymakers started to respond to falling module and installed
system costs by scaling back government-backed tax incentives and
rebates. Figure 7 shows the average pre-tax rebate for installed systems
decreased to less than $1 per watt from highs of $4 to $8 per watt in the
2000 to 2004 period.

25. Id. at viii, fig. ES-1.
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Figure 7: Declining State Rebates and Incentives26

II. REGULATORY POLICIES SUPPORTING NEM INSTALLATION GROWTH
In addition to technological advances and declining costs, a number of
state and federal regulatory policies and tax incentives have encouraged
the development of NEM capacity.
A. Louisiana and Other State-level NEM Policies
The origins of state NEM polices date back to the initial days of
PURPA implementation in the early 1980s, which attempted to extend the
access, buy-back, and back-up provisions afforded to large scale cogenerators to smaller, distribution-level generation resources. In the early
1980s, ten states had enacted either NEM policies, programs, or
legislation.27
The passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992) brought
a renewed interest in efficiency and small-scale generation opportunities.
As part of reviewing and implementing policies outlined in EPAct 1992,
several states adopted utility specific or statewide NEM policies during
the 1990s. These policies represent the more “modern” period of NEM
adoption and are the basis for many state NEM policies that are still in
place today. The increased policy emphasis on renewable energy during
26. BARBOSE ET AL., supra note 21, at 22, fig. 14.
27. ln Re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-owned Solar Generation
and Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Ex
Parte, Review of LPSC Rules Regarding Distributed Generation: Report on Phase
II of Rule-Making, Docket No. R-33929 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 8, 2019).
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this time period resulted in new and additional restrictions on state
regulatory NEM policies. The new restrictions ensured that only those
generators bringing renewable or efficiency benefits, as opposed to those
that simply offered simple cycle generation opportunities, were promoted
at the distribution interconnection level.
For instance, all but two state-level NEM programs adopted during the
1990s limited NEM eligibility to renewable technologies. During the
1990s, 11 more states enacted state policies for NEM.28 Currently, 48
states and the District of Columbia have one or more utilities within the
state offering NEM service, and many state policies currently allow NEM
state-wide.
Louisiana’s first foray into NEM began in 2003 when the Louisiana
Legislature passed Act 653, which allowed the LPSC to define rules and
conditions for both residential and smaller-scale commercial NEM
installations. Originally, Louisiana statutes restricted residential NEM
installations to 25 kW or less, whereas commercial systems were restricted
to 100 kW or less.29 Those capacity limitations increased in 2008 via Act
543, allowing commercial systems to be as large as 300 kW.
Statutes created Louisiana’s original NEM policies, which were
designed to provide a unique opportunity for niche solar installations
since, at that time, these systems were still very expensive relative to
utility-provided electricity. Ultimately, the LPSC initiated a rulemaking
proceeding in 2005 to further flesh out the details on what types of NEM
installations would be allowed, any limitations on NEM installation sizes,
any other caps or restrictions on aggregate level of NEM installations that
would be allowed on a per utility basis, and, most importantly, how
electricity “put” to the distribution grid by NEM systems would be
reimbursed.
Louisiana’s original NEM rules were comparable to those
promulgated by many other states. The LPSC, for instance, codified the
original statutory restrictions on individual installation sizes noted earlier.
The LPSC also defined a utility-specific cap that restricted the total
capacity on NEM systems for any utility to 0.5% of “monthly peak
demand.”30
The method by which “monthly peak demand” was measured
ultimately created some controversy, particularly later when the overall
utility-specific installation caps were close to being reached. Some utilities
28. YIH-HUEI WAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., CURRENT
EXPERIENCE WITH NET METERING PROGRAMS 7–9 (1998).
29. Net Energy Metering Rule-Making, General Order, Docket No. R-27558,
(La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 2005).
30. Id.
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took the position that “monthly peak demand” was defined as the highest
demand in any given month.31 Other parties, particularly the solar industry,
took the position that the cap should be calculated using the single highest
peak demand month, which usually occurs in the hottest months of August
or September for most Louisiana utilities.32
The Louisiana utility definition of monthly peak demand differs
substantially from traditional approaches since it estimates the solar
installation share based on the peak demand measured in any month, even
relatively lower demand shoulder months that arise in the spring and fall.
The utility interpretation would have set a much more restrictive cap
(limiting solar installations) than the one being argued by the solar
industry. Ultimately, the LPSC sided with the utility companies on the
definition of the utility-specific installed capacity cap,33 which led to a
situation where most utilities had reached their installed capacity caps in
the 2015 time period.34
Historically, Louisiana has also utilized a traditional net metering
approach to measuring monthly bills and reimbursements. That is, LPSCjurisdictional utilities assessed an NEM customer’s consumption and onsite generation and then subtracted the two (in terms of the kWh used and
generated in any given month) in order to arrive at a “net” amount (in
energy or kWh terms) that was subsequently multiplied by the retail rate.
If the number was negative, the utility would provide a credit to the NEM
customer, and if the number was positive, the NEM customer would remit
a net payment to the utility. Valuation for the electricity sold back to the
grid, in the early NEM policy debates, was set at full retail rates. In other
words, NEM customers were reimbursed for their grid sales at full retail
rates even though those full retail rates include reimbursement amounts
for the local utility for the costs of transmission and distribution service
and other costs entirely unrelated to electricity generation.
31. Consolidated Order, No. U-32913, Notification Pursuant to the LPSC’s
2011 Net Metering Order, Docket No. R-31417, (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Dec.
17, 2015).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Entergy Louisiana, LLC, Comments in Response to Staff’s Initial
Request for Comments (Phase II) Regarding Proposed Modifications to the
Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Docket No. R-33929, (Feb. 24, 2017),
http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=9d423808-e67f-440b-8fc6-b
0aaf2089f53 [https://perma.cc/3RQ3-HA4X]; Susan Buchanan, Solar Customers
Turned Away by Electric Co-ops, LA. WEEKLY, http://www.louisianaweekly
.com/solar-customers-turned-away-by-electric-co-ops/ [https://perma.cc/6JNJ-P
TQU?type=image] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 78

5/21/20 8:22 AM

2020]

REFORMING STATE-LEVEL SOLAR NET ENERGY METERING POLICIES

433

Soon after the 2005 LPSC rulemaking process, the Louisiana
Legislature adopted a set of solar energy tax credits, via Act 371 in 2007,
which were some of the most generous in the United States at the time
they were passed. These solar tax credits were based on an income tax
credit for residential property owners that installed solar or wind energy
systems after January 1, 2008. The solar energy tax incentive included a
50% income tax credit for the first $25,000 of the cost of each system with
a maximum credit of $12,500 per system.35 In 2009, the tax credit was
extended to all taxpayers. This credit was applicable to personal,
corporate, or franchise taxes, depending on the taxpayer purchasing and
installing the system. Later, the Louisiana Department of Revenue
confirmed, via private letter ruling, that a single taxpayer could be
refunded multiple credits by purchasing multiple systems.36
The Louisiana solar tax incentive, when combined with the federal
investment tax credit (ITC) of 30%, enabled Louisiana residents to offset
as much as 80%of the costs attributable to solar installations. Interestingly,
the Louisiana Legislature did not anticipate widespread participation in the
solar tax credit program when it was passed since the “fiscal note,” or the
state fiscal impact associated with the legislation was estimated to only
total around $500,000 per year.37 By 2016, the cumulative lost tax revenue
was estimated to have exceeded more than $147 million.38
Ultimately the interaction of (a) generous state tax incentives, (b)
generous federal tax incentives, and (c) considerable cost reductions in
smaller-scale rooftop PV, stimulated a massive amount of solar
installations in Louisiana. Collectively, these trends put most Louisiana
utilities in the position of meeting their NEM system caps as early as
2015.39 The challenge that arose for the Louisiana solar industry during
this time period was that utility companies were not required to continue
to enroll customers for NEM service after the utility-specific NEM
installed capacity caps were met.
Most Louisiana utilities continued to interconnect these solar projects
even after reaching their caps, even though LPSC rules did not require
35. LA. REV. STAT. § 47:6030(B) (2019).
36. La. Dep’t of Rev., Private Letter Ruling Redacted Version No. 09-018
Individual Income Tax and Corporation Income Tax Qualification for the Solar
Energy Systems Tax Credit (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.revenue.louisiana.gov/
LawsPolicies/PLR09018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7C6-CTNP].
37. Richard Thompson, Boon or Boondoggle? Mounting Costs of Louisiana
Solar Power Tax Breaks Could Spur Changes, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 8, 2012.
38. Jennifer Larino, Louisiana has no More Tax Credits for Solar Owners,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 20, 2016.
39. See sources cited supra note 34.
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these continued interconnections. Utilities did, however, limit the
reimbursement rate that post-cap NEM customers received for their NEM
generation to a much smaller “avoided cost” amount, measured as the
posted prices for wholesale electricity generation prevailing in regional
power markets at that time.
The LPSC upheld the utility post-cap reimbursement rates in 2016 in
a set of “interim rules” designed to be a stop-gap measure that utilities
would follow until the LPSC completed an omnibus rulemaking
investigation (Docket R-33929) designed to assess the prior NEM rules’
continued efficiency given current market conditions and regulatory
trends. The LPSC’s “phase 2” rulemaking process (conducted after the
post-interim, or phase 1 process) began in 2017 and lasted for two and a
half years.
In September 2019, the LPSC adopted its final set of updated NEM
rules that made several important changes to the Commission’s prior NEM
practices. First, the LPSC officially eliminated the 0.5% cap on each
utility’s allocation of NEM capacity thereby allowing solar installation in
the state to grow unfettered by any limit or constraint. Next, the
Commission outlined a new set of net metering guidelines that included
requiring all customer-generators (who submit interconnection requests
after December 31, 2019) to be credited for their electricity sales that go
back to the utility distribution grid at an avoided generation cost rate. The
LPSC defined this avoided cost rate as the posted market price for
wholesale electricity generation as reflected by the 12-month average
locational marginal price for each LPSC-jurisdictional electric utility.
The new NEM rule also created a 15-year grandfathering period for
installations that became active prior to year-end 2019. This
grandfathering provision allows prior-installed systems to continue to
receive the more generous retail rate form of reimbursement for their onsite generation, rather than the market-based electricity generation rate that
newer systems would be paid.40
B. Renewable Portfolio Standards as a Catalyst for NEM Growth
While rebates and tax policies have been important recent catalysts for
renewable energy development across the United States, one of the earliest
and perhaps more important catalysts for renewable energy development
has been the adoption of state-level renewable energy mandates that are
40. In re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-Owned Solar Generation
and Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules,
General Order, Docket No. R-33929, (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Sept. 19, 2019).
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referred to as renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policies. RPS policies
have been adopted extensively at the state level, not the federal level.
RPS policies set mandatory annual renewable energy generation
targets over some fixed period that can span from one to two decades.
These policies set annual renewable energy generation targets, usually
defined as a percent of total annual generation that each market participant
is required to fulfill on a pro-rata basis. These percentages typically ramp
up in a linear fashion over the target period. Figure 8 shows 38 states and
the District of Columbia have adopted an RPS or renewable energy goal.41
RPS states, collectively, represent over 75% of current retail U.S.
electricity sales, and the anticipated growth of renewable generation shares
are anticipated to increase by as much as one-third of some states’ retail
electricity sales by the year 2030.

Figure 8: State Renewable Portfolio Standards as of July 201842

RPS policies were adopted for a variety of reasons, the two primary
reasons being: (1) to reduce energy costs to consumers during a time
period when natural gas-based generation costs were very high; and (2) to

41. State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx [https://
perma.cc/4345-NXSM] (last updated Dec. 31, 2019).
42. Id.
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create economic development opportunities.43 Another important rationale
for the adoption of RPS policies was the belief that if a large enough
market for renewable energy could be guaranteed, over an extended time
period, investment in renewable energy manufacturing and development
would arise that would drive down average renewable energy
manufacturing cost as scale increased.44 In this instance, scale economies
were expected to arise through the RPS standard that increased on a yearto-year basis with the expectation that average renewable energy
development costs would fall as annual renewable energy percentages
increased.
Most RPS requirements were historically met through large,
transmission-level renewable energy investments, such as large-scale, onshore wind projects. Increasingly, though, a larger share of many states’
RPS requirements are met by both grid-scale solar energy projects
(interconnected into the transmission grid) as well behind-the-meter solar
generation (interconnected at the distribution grid level).45 All of these
renewable energy investments are financially supported, in large part,
through tradable credits known as “renewable energy certificates” (REC).
RPS policies effectively create a property right for renewable energy
developers that entitles each qualifying renewable energy generator to
receive one REC for each megawatt-hour (MWh) of renewable generation
that originates from the qualified facility. Market participants sell or
purchase RECs, which are then retired with state regulators in order to
meet each market participant’s individual RPS requirements. The market
forces of supply and demand help determine REC prices: when renewable
generation is abundant, RECs will be abundant, and the price of those
RECs will fall, and vice versa.
In most states, any qualifying renewable project, regardless of size,
can receive a REC. The projects can trade RECs and thus generate
additional revenue to support their investment. Most solar NEM
investments arising in states with an RPS can receive, at a minimum, a
REC and in some instances, can receive a solar REC (SREC) if there are
separate set-asides for solar energy in those states. Typically, a SREC has
a higher value than a conventional REC since installations competing to
sell these SRECs are based upon output from a solar facility, and not a
43. J. HEETER ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. & LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., A SURVEY OF STATE-LEVEL COST AND BENEFIT
ESTIMATES OF RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS (2014).
44. Sean Johnson et al., Feasibility of U.S. Renewable Portfolio Standards
under Cost Caps and Case Study for Illinois, 49 ENERGY POL’Y 499–500 (2012).
45. GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., U.S. RENEWABLES
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: 2019 ANNUAL STATUS REPORT 16, 19 (2019).
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variety of other lower cost renewable energy technologies such as onshore wind, biomass, and other lower-cost qualifying options.
Sales of RECs and SRECs (created as part of the RPS process) provide
additional financing opportunities for solar installations and when coupled
with on-site energy savings, state and federal tax credits, and generous
NEM reimbursement policies, have helped stimulate an unanticipated
large level of solar installations. Like tax incentives, RPS policies helped
to create a situation where the growth of solar installations, including those
that are classified as NEM installations, have far exceeded what many
states anticipated when their NEM policies were adopted. Thus, RPScreated growth has led to many instances where states have had to re-visit
their NEM policies.
C. NEM Measurement Issues
One of the initial NEM policy reforms that states have addressed over
the last several years involves how the actual “netting” process for
electricity flows back and forth from an NEM customer are measured.
Historically, most states utilized a very simple approach at “netting” NEM
on-site generation and consumption. This netting process requires utilities
to take the difference between an individual NEM installation’s billing
period consumption (in kWh terms) and its on-site generation (also in
kWh) terms and “net” those two numbers. If the generation was greater
than the consumption, then that “net” amount of generation was multiplied
by a reimbursement rate (usually the full retail rate) and credited to the
NEM customer’s account. If the consumption amount was greater than the
generation amount, that difference was multiplied by the retail rate and
charged to the NEM customer. If generation and consumption were
exactly offsetting, then the NEM customer would owe the utility company
nothing for that billing period.
The problem with this “traditional” netting approach is that it
effectively values generation and consumption on equal terms. As this
Article discusses in greater detail below, retail rates (and the service
supported by these rates) are “bundled” and include several utility
functions including generation, transmission, distribution, customer
service and other administrative and general (A&G) functions. The “full”
retail rate reflects all these costs. The problem with “valuing” NEM
generation at this full retail rate is that NEM generation does not “avoid”
a large part of these retail functions such as transmission, distribution,
customer service, and A&G. Thus, some regulators have adopted
approaches that more accurately reflect the unbundled, “generation-only”
value of these behind-the-meter solar resources.
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Modification to the measurement and valuation of NEM generation
can utilize three different alternatives. The first, and one that is becoming
more common, is referred to as “two-channel” billing, or “net billing.”
Under two-channel billing, all electricity exported by the NEM customer
to the utility’s distribution grid is valued at a rate consistent with the
utility’s generation cost, something that is commonly referred to as the
utility’s “avoided cost of generating electricity.” The avoided cost, as used
in this and many other instances in utility regulation, is simply the
marginal cost of generating electricity. It is often called the “avoided” cost
since it also represents, at the margin, the cost of electricity “avoided” by
using the alternative generating resource, which, in this instance, is the
NEM renewable generation.
Recently, several states attempted to reform their NEM processes to
incorporate this two-channel approach. Nevada was one of the first states
to reform its traditional approach in order to utilize a two-channel method
for Nevada Power Company and Sierra Pacific Power Company (NV
Energy).46 The Nevada Commission’s decision was followed shortly by
similar NEM policy changes adopting two-channel billing in Arizona,47
Hawaii,48 and Indiana.49 More recently, Michigan also adopted a twochannel NEM approach.50 Interestingly, in June 2017, the Nevada
Legislature passed a statute that effectively overturned the Nevada
Commission’s February 2016 decision and reinstated traditional net
metering.51
46. Application of Nevada Power Company d/b/a NV Energy for Approval
of a Cost-of Service Study and Net Metering Tariffs, Modified Final Order,
Docket No. 15-07042, (Nev. Pub. Util. Comm’n Feb. 17, 2016). Application of
Sierra Pacific Company d/b/a NV Energy for Approval of a Cost-of-service Study
and Net Metering Tariffs, Docket No. 15-07041, ¶ 94 (Nev. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
Feb. 17, 2016).
47. In the Matter of the Commission’s Investigation of Value and Cost of
Distributed Generation, Opinion and Order (Decision No. 75859), Docket No. E00000J-14-0023, (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n Jan. 3, 2017).
48. Instituting a Proceeding to Investigate Distributed Energy Resource
Policies, Decision and Order (No. 33258), Docket No. 2014-0192, (Pub. Utils.
Comm’n of Haw., Oct. 12, 2015).
49. S.B. 309, 120th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017).
50. In the Matter, on the Commission’s Own Motion, to Implement the
Provisions of Sections 173 and 183(1) of 2016 PA 342, and Section 6a(14) of 2016
PA 341, Order, Case No. U-18383, (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Apr. 18, 2018).
51. Application of Nevada Power Company d/b/a NV Energy and Sierra
Pacific Power Company d/b/a NV Energy for Approval of Tariff Schedules and
Rates Pursuant to Assembly Bill 405, Order, Docket No. 17-07026, (Nev. Pub.
Util. Comm’n, Sept. 1, 2017).
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The second alternative to traditional net metering that emerged in
recent years is referred to as a “value of solar” (VOS) approach. The VOS
approach is similar to two-channel billing in that the consumption and
production streams of an NEM customer are considered separately. The
primary difference, however, is that rather than valuing solar generation at
the marginal or avoided cost of generation only, a VOS approach values
on-site solar generation based on a host of other considerations that include
but is not limited to: avoided generation costs; avoided costs of
transmission and distribution investment; avoided environmental
compliance costs; and avoided line losses. In most states, such
considerations have the net impact of raising the NEM generation
reimbursement rate to levels that are comparable to, if not higher than,
what was previously offered using a retail rate valuation method. For
example, Mississippi values electricity exported by a NEM solar generator
to the electric utility distribution grid at $0.025 plus the applicable utility’s
avoided cost rate.52 Thus, if the avoided cost reported in the market is
$0.03, a Mississippi-based NEM generator will get $0.055 per kWh (three
cents plus the $0.025 VOS “adder”) for its excess generation that is put to
the electric utility grid.
The third alternative to traditional net metering limits the portion of
exported electricity from a distributed generation facility that can be
applied against a customer’s transmission and distribution portion of
electric bills. For instance, in March 2017, the Maine Public Utilities
Commission completed a rulemaking process to replace its traditional net
metering rules with a revised version that would phase-out the ability of
net metered customers to use distributed generation systems to net charges
associated with transmission and distribution service over a 15-year
period.53 Shortly after Maine adopted this revised net metering approach,
New Hampshire approved a similar policy change that reduced the
creditable portion of distributed generation to only 25% for distribution
purposes.54

52. In re: Order Establishing Docket to Investigate the Development and
Implementation of Net Metering Programs and Standards Order Adopting Net
Metering Rule, Order, Docket No. 2011-AD-2, (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Dec.
3, 2015).
53. Public Utilities Commission Amendments to Net Energy Billing Rule
(Chapter 313), Order Adopting Rule and Statement of Factual and Policy Basis,
Docket No. 2016-00222, (Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Me., Mar. 1, 2017).
54. Development of New Alternative Net Metering Tariffs and/or Other
Regulatory Mechanisms and Tariffs for Customer-Generators, Order No. 26,029,
Docket No. DE 16-576, (N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, June 23, 2017).
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Figure 9: Alternate Net Metering Policies55

D. Individual System Capacity Requirements
Most states limit the size (capacity) of any NEM resource
interconnected into a utility’s distribution grid. The policy purpose of this
restriction is simple: facilitate behind-the-meter solar installations and
facilitate some distribution sales at times when the host may be
underutilizing the self-generated electricity. The goals of these NEM
policies have not been to create an entirely new set of stand-alone
generators that are being dispatched into the distribution level of the
utility’s grid in a manner comparable to what goes on at the bulk power
system level. NEM policies have never been about creating “mini”
merchant power plants.
NEM capacity restrictions vary by state and often by customer class
(i.e., residential versus commercial may have differing capacity caps).
There are currently five states (Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Ohio, and
New Jersey) that do not implement a strict capacity restriction (in terms of
a fixed kW installation capacity cap) but instead evaluate systems on an
application-by-application basis based on the capacity of the proposed
55. ln Re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-owned Solar Generation
and Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Ex
Parte, Review of LPSC Rules Regarding Distributed Generation: Report on Phase
II of Rule-Making, Docket No. R-33929 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 8, 2019).

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 86

5/21/20 8:22 AM

2020]

REFORMING STATE-LEVEL SOLAR NET ENERGY METERING POLICIES

441

installation relative to the host’s total annual usage. In other words, these
states usually require an individual NEM customer’s installation to not
exceed their highest peak monthly demand, or some small share above that
level, like 110% above the highest monthly peak. This percentage of
usage-based capacity installation cap holds regardless of whether the
installation is at a commercial facility or is a residential household.
Each state’s NEM installation-specific size limitations are presented
in Figure 10. This figure highlights the size restrictions for commercial,
and in some instances, industrial-oriented NEM installations. If the state
is indicated as having a size restriction based on “annual usage,” this
entails that the state restricts total NEM capacity to some share, usually
100% of the host’s highest monthly peak.

Figure 10: State NEM Capacity Limits (Commercial/Industrial Systems)56

As recently as 2014, there were only 14 states which had separate
residential system limitations.57 However, as seen in Figure 11, these
restrictions have changed considerably over the last several years, with
most states now having some type of capacity restriction in place, even for
56. Id.
57. Id.
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residential installations. The typical residential household has a peak
demand somewhere around 7.5 kW, and large residential customers have
a peak demand around 11 kW.58 Figure 11 shows that a large number of
states have residential capacity restrictions at 50 kW or greater, a level far
above the average, as well as upper end of most residential customers’
peak usage.

Figure 11: State Residential NEM Capacity Limits59

E. Aggregate/System Level NEM Capacity Limitations
Most states have aggregate NEM capacity limitations, which restrict
the total amount of NEM capacity that utilities can install at a given point
in time. The policy rationales for adopting these total utility capacity
restrictions have been to minimize ratepayer exposure to any potential

58. JUOZAS ABARAVICIUS ET AL., AM. COUNCIL ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON.,
MORE OR LESS ABOUT DATA: ANALYZING LOAD DEMAND IN RESIDENTIAL
HOUSES 12-8, fig. 5 (2006).
59. ln Re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-owned Solar Generation
and Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Ex
Parte, Review of LPSC Rules Regarding Distributed Generation: Report on Phase
II of Rule-Making, Docket No. R-33929 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 8, 2019).
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unexpected policy or ratemaking consequences of having too much NEM
capacity on a utility’s distribution system.60
Figure 12 shows that 28 states (56%) have aggregate/system level
NEM capacity limitations. Nine states have aggregate capacity limits of
between 1.0% and 2.9% of a utility system’s annual peak demand, while
another three states, have set aggregate capacity limits on net metering at
less than 1.0% of a utility system’s annual peak demand. Another three
states (Maryland, Nevada, and New Hampshire) impose a fixed aggregate
NEM capacity cap, on MW terms, that is not tied to some share of a
utility’s annual system peak. For instance, Maryland has an
administratively determined total NEM capacity limitation of 1,500
MW,61 which is set on a statewide basis, not a utility basis. Nevada
assesses its NEM aggregate capacity limitations on a percentage of annual
statewide peak demand rather than a fixed statewide capacity amount.
Until 2019, Louisiana had a utility specific NEM capacity cap of 0.5% of
a utility’s monthly peak demand, but recently removed this cap during the
process of changing and modifying its NEM rules.62

60. J. HEETER ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. & LAWRENCE
BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., STATUS OF NET METERING: ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL
TO REACH PROGRAM CAPS, at v (2014).
61. MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.10.01(A) (2019).
62. In re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-Owned Solar Generation and
Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Ex Parte,
General Order, Docket No. R-33929, (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Sept. 19, 2019).
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Figure 12: State Policies Regarding Aggregate Utility System Capacity Limits63

F. Excess Generation Payments and Credits
Two of the most controversial issues associated with state regulatory
NEM reform include: (a) the method which calculates “net” NEM
generation; and (b) the means by which NEM generation will be valued.
Both issues are interrelated because valuation is at the heart of the matter
for each. Historically, valuing NEM generation at full retail rates was a
relatively straightforward and administratively simple approach, even if
many regulators and most utilities recognized that this valuation approach
likely did not reflect the true opportunity cost of NEM generation. Today,
however, thousands, if not tens of thousands, of NEM customers are
interconnected into utility distribution grids making the financial and
ratemaking ramifications of even small NEM valuation errors
considerable.
Many state regulatory commissions are currently re-assessing NEM
generation valuation. A large number are considering proposals that would
63. ln Re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-owned Solar Generation
and Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Ex
Parte, Review of LPSC Rules Regarding Distributed Generation: Report on Phase
II of Rule-Making, Docket No. R-33929, (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 8, 2019).
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value NEM generation in a fashion comparable to any other form of selfgenerated electricity, including industrial cogenerated electricity
originally motivated by PURPA. Typically, the “avoided cost” of
wholesale power generation is valued as the LMP, which is reported by
independent third parties, such as a Regional Transmission Organization
(RTO) or Independent System Operator (ISO). If one assumes that an
LMP-based measure is the more accurate measure (a position on which
solar advocates do not agree), then the flows of electricity utilized for onsite consumption and those associated with on-site generation need to be
separately measured and valued. Thus, the first controversial issue in this
reform debate is how this accounting should be handled, and, increasingly,
many states are moving to the two-channel approach.
The next controversial issue becomes determining the per unit value
that will be used to credit the separately identified NEM generation put to
the utility distribution grid. NEM valuation policies can be generally
divided into two distinct models: cost-based or incentive-based
approaches. Cost-based approaches value NEM generation at a utility’s
avoided or marginal cost of energy. Cost-based approaches vary
depending upon whether the utility or state in question is part of an
organized regional power market. For those utilities that are part of an
organized market, then the LMPs discussed earlier, which reflect the
hourly cost of generation being dispatched by the RTO or ISO, serve as
the cost-proxy. For those utilities that are not part of an organization
market, some cost-based proxy, developed from some type of generation
(production) cost model is utilized. This production cost model utilizes
inputs on all variable production operating costs, such as fuel stock
purchases and variable emission control costs, and any other variable
operating costs. Incentive-based approaches value generation contributed
by the net metered generation system at some administratively determined
price that tends to be either maintaining the use of full retail rates for
valuing NEM generation, or some other VOS-based estimate that was
discussed earlier. Figure 13 shows that numerous states incentivize excess
solar generation by crediting it at the retail rate. Meanwhile, other states,
such as Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, and Louisiana value this
excess solar generation on an avoided cost basis. Georgia, however,
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utilizes an administratively determined rate to reimburse excess NEM
generation.

Figure 13: State Policies Regarding Excess Credit Valuation64

Lastly, once states determine a valuation approach, states must then
decide how these credits will be transferred, accrued, and, in some
instances, banked for future use. Generally, there are two methods of
financial reimbursement: (1) offering a credit for each kWh of NEM
generation (direct credit); or (2) offering payment for each kWh of NEM
generation (direct payment). Most states use the first method, which
allows any net excess generation to be carried over to the NEM customer’s
next bill as a kWh credit. In some states, credits that accrue during a 12month period will be paid to the customer via check or billing credit.65
Other states, including Louisiana, allow a cash payment for outstanding
excess solar generation credit balances if the NEM customer discontinues

64. ln Re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-owned Solar Generation
and Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Ex
Parte, Docket No. R-33929, Review of LPSC Rules Regarding Distributed
Generation: Report on Phase II of Rule-Making, (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 8,
2019).
65. Net Metering, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFFICIENCY, https://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/276 [https://
perma.cc/UNN2-RSLH] (last visited Jan. 17, 2020).

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 92

5/21/20 8:22 AM

2020]

REFORMING STATE-LEVEL SOLAR NET ENERGY METERING POLICIES

447

service, while others do not allow a cash payment at all, and any unused
credit is retained by the utility.66
The direct payment method of reimbursement usually involves
offering an NEM generator some type of predefined rate for its generation,
and then offering a monthly payment to that generator for the excess
generation put to a utility’s electric distribution grid.67 Very few states,
however, reimburse for NEM generation via direct payment. For example,
in New Mexico the utility can choose how to deal with net excess
generation. It may credit or pay the customer for NEM generation at the
utility’s avoided cost rate, or it may credit the customer for the kWh of
NEM generation from month-to-month and pay for any accrued credits if
the customer terminates service.68
Figure 14 highlights state policies for reimbursement of accrued NEM
generation credits. Only two states, Arizona and Texas, allow permanent
banking of NEM generation credits, meaning those credits can rollover
and accumulate without expiring. Most states reset all excess generation
credits without compensation annually. At the end of an annualized period,
any NEM generation credits in the customer’s account expire and are
ceded to the utility. In Oregon and Utah, any NEM generation credits
accrued in an NEM customer’s account at the end of 12 months are valued
at the utility’s avoided cost and paid to fund low-income assistance
programs.69
The remaining states pay annually accrued NEM generation credits at
either the full retail rate, or an avoided cost rate. Louisiana requires utilities
to compensate new net metered generators based on the utilities’ avoided
cost rate for any excess generation remaining in the final month a customer
takes service from the utility, i.e., when a customer closes out his or her
account.

66. Attachment A, Ex Parte, Docket No. R-31417, Section. 2.04C, General
Order, (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, July 26, 2013). Net Metering, supra note 65.
67. N.M. CODE R. § 17.9.570 (2019).
68. Id.
69. OR. ADMIN. R. 860-039-0060 (2019). UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 54-15-104
(2019).
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Figure 14: State Policies Regarding Payment of Accrued/Banked NEG Credits70

G. Net Metering Aggregation/Community Solar
Net metering aggregation, also referred to as “community solar,”
represents a solar policy initiative that can be pursued with NEM-based
systems. These programs allow for a set of often similarly situated
customers to “aggregate” their resources into one solar investment to help
mitigate the costs of that investment, spread its potential risk, and assist in
broader community participation in the promotion of renewable energy.
This aggregation can also, in some instances, help reduce the per-unit
installed cost of a solar project if a larger, lower-unit cost installation is
being developed for a set of customers rather than having each customer
make an individual rooftop investment of their own. One example is the
development of a community solar project for a small residential
neighborhood. Further, a larger project may be developed on communal
land for the neighborhood, and each neighbor makes a financial
contribution to cover the cost of the system.
70. ln Re: Review of Policies Related to Customer-owned Solar Generation
and Possible Modification of the Commission’s Current Net Metering Rules, Ex
Parte, Docket No. R-33929, Review of LPSC Rules Regarding Distributed
Generation: Report on Phase II of Rule-Making, (La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Jan. 8,
2019).
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Several states allow community solar projects to participate in the
NEM tariff/service offering. While other states may allow community
solar projects, but do not allow those projects to also participate in NEM.
Figure 15 shows that 23 states, or approximately 46% of jurisdictions with
net metering policies, have implemented policies allowing customers to
aggregate with one another to attain NEM service.
NEM aggregation policies differ substantially from state to state
regarding specifics such as eligible customers and tariffs, and geographic
limitations for aggregation. For instance, six states with NEM aggregation
policies do not allow non-physically connected or “virtual” aggregation
(solar farm or community). Furthermore, states with policies allowing
virtual net metering aggregation are concentrated in the Northeast and MidAtlantic. Only four states outside of these two regions (Arkansas, California,
Colorado, and Washington), allow for virtual net metering aggregation.

Figure 15: State Policies Regarding Net Energy Metering Aggregation71

CONCLUSION
The growth of solar energy over the past decade has not come without
a certain amount of growing pains. This should not be unexpected as, for
decades, a very extensive set of regulatory and legislative set-asides,
71. Id.
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incentives, and subsidies have buttressed solar energy; changing or
modifying any of these is no easy task. However, past policies have opted
to support these mechanisms, in large part, because the perceived cost of
doing so was not that unreasonable given: (a) the anticipated benefits that
could arise from “kick-starting” an emerging industry with positive
environmental attributes; and (b) what was seen at the time as niche,
behind-the-meter generation technology. This has all changed over the
past decade as installations have expanded in an exponential, not linear
fashion. Today, solar energy is (under certain measures) competitive with
many types of fossil fuel-based generation, particularly at grid-scale
installation level.
Solar’s growth, and its successes, raises two important policy
questions. First, can or should public policy continue to support
technologies that are at or have met commercial competitiveness? Second,
can public policy continue to lay out the level and scope of financial
support for technologies that are currently installed at capacity levels (and
installation numbers) that are orders of magnitude larger than historic
norms? Regulatory policy has been grappling, in large part, with both
questions over the past several years. Most utility regulators, and some
state legislatures, have recognized some policies need to be changed to
reflect current policy and market realities. NEM policies are one such area
that has needed, and is receiving, a workover to correct prior design
inefficiencies that have been allowed to persist, for various reasons, over
the past several decades.
One of the more controversial aspects of the NEM policy reform
process has been the reduction of reimbursement rates for behind-themeter excess generation that is put to the utility distribution grid. The
inefficiencies inherent in prior NEM generation reimbursement/valuation
practices represent one of the more pervasive excess costs associated with
legacy NEM policies. However, these reimbursement rates also strike at
what is considered a very important selling point for solar developers in
respective retail markets: the ability to sell-back, as opposed to purchase,
electricity. While no NEM policy reform is removing that ability, many
solar advocates often suggest that any reform of the current reimbursement
rate that is downward in nature is tantamount to eliminating such
privileges.
The problem with leaving inefficient reimbursement rates and other
NEM legacy policies in place is that they are not without a cost, and that
cost continues to grow on a year-end and year-out basis. The cost of every
kWh of self-generated electricity that is purchased by utility from a NEM
installation is passed along to other non-NEM retail customers. For
example, if the prevailing market rate for wholesale electricity generation
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is three cents per kWh, and the retail rate of electricity (which reflects the
cost of generation, transmission and distribution), is nine cents per kWh,
then the other, non-NEM retail ratepayers will be paying for this excess
six cents per kWh cost. This may not have been a big issue in the past
when NEM installations numbered in the hundreds, but today, it becomes
exceptionally problematic, inequitable, and very likely regressive when
these NEM installations number in the thousands or tens of thousands,
which is increasingly becoming the case for many utilities across the
country.
Thus, it is not unreasonable to see NEM reforms undertaken at the
state level in response to the rapid growth of behind-the-meter solar
generation. The purpose of this NEM reform process is often
misunderstood and, unfortunately, misrepresented. This Article attempts
to put some of these changes into perspective with past precedents and
current trends. The bottom line, however, is that the NEM reform process
is not and should not be considered one that attempts to shut down or
somehow discourage continued cost-effective residential and small
commercial solar installations.
States are still supporting and maintaining NEM policies, even though
the policies are changing. The goal in the NEM reform process is simply
to minimize the negative ramifications that legacy aspects of these rules
have had, and continue to have, on non-NEM customers. One thing that
has not changed about these NEM rules and policies is their fundamental
commitment to reducing market barriers to behind-the-meter generation
and setting up a system of rules for access that is fair, non-discriminatory
(from a generation technology or ownership perspective) and consistent.
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